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Abstract
In this paper, we re-examine the magnitude of the impact of government spending on private
consumption by a new Keynesian approach, focusing on the role of military spending. For this
reason, we separate civilian and military spending in the U.S. economy and analyse their respective
effects. Our VAR estimates show, as expected, that civilian expenditure induces a positive and
significant response on private consumption whereas military spending has a negative impact.
We then develop a simple DSGE new Keynesian model to simulate the empirical evidence under
a larger persistence of shocks and a different financing mechanism in military spending, the latter
reproducing the propensity of policy-makers to use budget deficits to finance wars. Lastly, simulated
impulse response functions of alternative specification models prove the robustness of our analysis.
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1 Introduction
There is a long tradition in the U.S. in explaining large budgets of military spending
by their economic function, necessary to maintain the growth and profitability of the
economy. It is argued that, as a component of government spending, the military sector
plays an anticyclical role when the economic system cannot generate enough effective
demand, consumption and investment to maintain full employment. However, this tradi-
tional Keynesian point of view is contradicted by data indicating that downward trends
in the share of military spending are not marked by any corresponding upward trends in
unemployment or decreases in potential output 1.
Conversely, a neoclassical approach suggests a strategic explanation to account for the
economic effects of large cyclical rises in defence spending. Based on major unexpected
political events, it assumes that the periods of increased defence spending correspond
to the dates of war or the threat of war. Ramey and Shapiro (1998), later extended by
Ramey’s recent work (2011), proposed a so-called "narrative" approach, which selected the
start of the three wars in which the U.S. actively intervened, Korean, Vietnam and the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the 2001 terroristic attack, to identify large exogenous
increases in the U.S. defence spending empirically. Edelberg et al. (1999), Burnside et al.
(2004) and Barro (2011) produced closely related follow-ups of the work by Ramey and
Shapiro (1998).
The significant criticism of this approach is that other substantial fiscal shocks may
have occurred at around the same time, thus interferring with identification of the military
build-up shocks and inferences on the effects of fiscal policy2.
Following the seminal paper of Blanchard and Perotti (2002), the economic literature
has proposed an alternative approach to test the effects of fiscal policy on economy.
The models are based on a vector autoregressive model (VAR) with differences in the
identification issues of fiscal shocks. A non-exhaustive set of the very large body of
empirical literature includes structural restrictions of impulse response functions (Uhlig,
2005; Mountford and Uhlig, 2005; Canova and Pappa, 2007; Enders et al., 2008), relations
among variables and error terms in the structural form (Marcellino, 2006; Beetsma et al.,
2006; Beetsma, 2008; Benetrix and Lane, 2009; Corsetti et al., 2012) or the inclusion of
external and institutional information which tends to exploit the quarterly nature of data
1See Smith (2009) for a critical review.
2As an example of this debate, Perotti (2005) argues that "Ramey and Shapiro date the start of the Korean war shock
in 1950:3, based on the large observed increase in military spending; but in four quarters between 1948:2 and 1950:3,
government spending increased by between two and three standard deviations. It is not obvious how to disentangle the
effects of the Korean dummy variable from the delayed effects of these large fiscal shocks".
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and fiscal policy decision lags (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; Perotti, 2005; Muller, 2008;
Monacelli and Perotti, 2008).
This paper starts by reviewing the empirical economic consequences of changes in U.S.
fiscal policy following a baseline structural VAR (SVAR) model extended for the fiscal
components of military sector and civilian government purchases. We mostly focus on
the short-run consequences of military spending, because the main question of interest
is to what extent unexpected military spending produces effects on private consumption.
We use as a basis the findings of Galì’s et al. (2007), that a positive government spend-
ing shock leads to a significant increase in private consumption when military spending
is excluded by the data, to infer the hypothesis that military spending has a negligible
or negative impact on consumption. However, the literature found conflicting empirical
results. For example, Hall’s (1986) analysis using annual data back to 1920, and also iden-
tifying government spending shocks through shifts in military spending, finds a slightly
negative effect of government purchases on consumption.
Similarly to Blanchard and Perotti (2002), who estimate fiscal effects of output multi-
pliers, we report a comparison of the VAR effects of military and civilian spending shocks
of consumption for the US: while we find a negative effect of military expenditure on
consumption, this does not exclude reconciling this result within the new Keynesian ap-
proach for fiscal effect in aggregate. In accordance with this line of inquiry, we also find
that civilian government purchases have a large effect on consumption.
The main contribution of our paper is to model consumption response to changes of
military and civilian components by a new Keynesian framework with monopolistic com-
petition and nominal rigidities (Bilbiie et al., 2008). This framework encompasses many
ingredients of recent dynamic optimizing sticky price models, although it is modified by
allowing for the presence of consumers subject to credit constraints, that is households
that do not participate in asset markets3. In fact, the basic intertemporal models upon
representative agents predicts the negative wealth effect associated with an increase in
government spending, which lowers consumption and, in turn, lowers the real wage. De-
spite this negative wealth effect, the response of consumption to a spending shock can
be positive under the presence of non-Ricardian consumers (Galì et al., 2007). There is
another important specific characteristic of the time-series of government spending com-
ponents to be considered. In fact, the existence of heterogeneous consumers - Ricardian
people - tends to mitigate the immediate economic effects of positive government shocks,
and this crowding out channel is emphasized in military spending, where the strong per-
3See, Campbell and Mankiw (1989), for the original description of the economic behaviour of non-Ricardian consumers.
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sistence of this component, generally recorded in data, is able to reduce the consumption
transmission channel of the labour supply by the wealth effect.
In addition, the heterogeneity of consumers also implies different spreads through which
fiscal policy transmits the effects to the economy and it is made explicit by the financing
mechanism of debt and of current government spending. This issue is particularly im-
portant in our analysis, when we examine the effects of military spending with respect
a civilian spending because, for example, differences in the taxation propensity (or other
forms of financing) lead to heterogeneous responses in private consumption. Different
from Favero and Giavazzi (2007), who explicitly include the long run government budget
constraint, the new Keynesian model presented below comprises, along with a taxation
rule, a deficit financing rule.
Our simulated results of the baseline new Keynesian model show that private con-
sumption responds positively to civilian spending whereas military expenditure affect
negatively private consumption. Both the model results seem to be at work in explaining
the empirical results. Then, we compare the dynamic responses of private consump-
tion to positive government component shocks with models which have more neoclassical
contents. Modelling only households that smooth consumption by participating in asset
markets, we also calibrate negative IRFs of civilian spending on consumption, a result in
accordance with the new Keynesian predictions. The rest of this paper is organized as
follows. Section 2 discusses the basic literature and some stylized facts of how the U.S.
finances government spending, in particular within the identified war dates. Section 3
presents our empirical specifications (showing the data and discussing the identification
procedure) and contains estimation results (with particular regard to the reaction of pri-
vate consumption to different kinds of government expenditure shocks). Section 4 presents
the theoretical framework of the DSGE model. Section 5 contains the model calibration
and examines the simulated impulse response of consumption to the different government
spending shocks, focusing on the role of military spending shocks and its consistency with
the empirical evidence. Section 6 concludes.
2 Consumption Crowding-out/in and Public Financing: Base-
line Literature and Some Stylized Facts
Barro (1974, 1979, 1981) conducted several studies highlighting the economic effects of
government spending and the alternative methods and impacts of financing this expen-
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diture. In particular, Barro (1981) stressed the fact that government expenditures can
provide direct welfare to economic agents, and that variations in the level of government
expenditure may have an impact on the consumption decisions of households. As a re-
sult, many studies have estimated the extent to which economic agents treat government
expenditure as substitute or complement to private consumption expenditure (e.g., Ko-
rmendi, 1983; Aschauer, 1985; Graham and Himarious, 1991; Karras, 1994; Ni, 1995;
Amano and Wirjanto, 1998).
However, evidence from the 1980’s and 1990’s is not conclusive. Using different data
sets for the U.S., Aschauer (1985) and Kormendi (1983) found a small substitution effect
between private and public consumption, whereas Campbell and Mankiw (1990) did not
find any significant effect in a post-war data set for the U.S. Karras (1994) also found
complementarity between public and private consumption in a number of countries. This
uncertainty of results was confirmed by Ni (1995), who showed that the relationship
between private and government consumption was sensitive to the choice of the utility
function and the interest rate measurement, as well as the time-span of the sample used
in estimates.
It is a fact that the diversity of results may be a consequence of a number of restric-
tive assumptions which were used in the various studies. One evident concern is the use
of aggregated government expenditures which assumes that a homogeneous channel of
transmission of fiscal policy cannot be distinguished among specific relationships on pri-
vate decisions of consumption. More recently, studies based on this point have tested the
existence of substitution or complementarity of the components of government spending
on private consumption (Fleissig and Rossana, 2003; Fiorito and Kollintzas, 2004; Aristei
and Pieroni, 2008) and, as a related subject, the optimal size of the public sector.
In addition, part of this literature addressed interest in the impact of alternative fi-
nancing methods for a given path of government expenditure. We build on this argument
to show that different sources of financing of the components of the public sector lead to
a different impact on private consumption when consumers are constrained in their asset
purchases.
Here, we focus on military spending to describe military outlay and the different mech-
anisms used to finance it in the U.S. Table 1 shows the financing sources of government
outlay (e.g., military and civilian) under the direct control of the fiscal policy4. We also
stress that our interest focuses on shocks near war time (including times in threat of war)
to account for more unanticipated expenditure and financing behaviour. As a link with
4The difference between revenue and expenditure should also be matched by changes in money supply.
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the literature, we refer to the U.S. war episodes described by Ramey (2011) except for
the Korean war, which is outside our sample. This choice does not meaningfully affect
the results since the variation in military spending was important during the 1960’s and
the 1970’s (Bilbiie et al., 2008; Pieroni, 2009).
Table 1: Government spending and financing mechanisms in the U.S. for military conflicts and episodes
Time Military outlay Civilian outlay Budget Deficit Tax-revenue
(% of GDP) (% of GDP) (% of GDP) (% of GDP)
Vietnam conflict Q1-1963 13.61 17.53 -0.85 28.83
Q1-1965 11.21 17.67 -0.03 28.12
Q1-1967 13.18 18.09 -2.71 28.51
Q1-1969 12.15 17.81 0.43 31.57
Q1-1971 9.73 17.99 -2.47 29.54
Q1-1973 7.56 17.15 -0.19 31.28
Q1-1975 7.21 18.76 -4.26 30.64
Carter-Reagan Q1-1980 6.40 16.71 -2.12 31.36
Military Build-up Q1-1982 7.16 16.38 -3.89 32.33
Q1-1984 7.46 15.15 -4.56 31.46
Q1-1986 7.72 15.82 -5.02 32.00
Q1-1988 7.89 15.41 -4.04 32.76
Desert Storm Q1-1989 7.35 15.39 -2.86 33.19
Operation Q1-1991 7.45 16.27 -4.06 33.03
Q1-1993 6.27 16.00 -5.83 32.46
11 September 2001 Q1-1999 4.21 14.92 0.63 34.84
and 2nd Iraq War Q1-2000 4.01 14.81 1.79 35.73
Q1-2001 4.09 14.83 0.93 35.49
Q1-2002 4.27 15.34 -3.50 32.17
Q1-2003 4.44 15.32 -4.68 31.76
Q1-2004 4.73 14.69 -4.90 31.28
Notes: Percentages of civilian and military expenditures over GDP obtained from Bureau of Economic Analysis (various
years). Budget deficit and tax revenues as percentages of GDP from OECD Economic Outlook, No. 88.
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It is not difficult to see that budget deficits were used to finance most of the military
operations. At the peak of the war episodes, the percentage of budget deficit in GDP
was around 4-6%. However, the tax revenue did not change at the onset of war episodes,
except during the Carter-Reagan military build-up, when taxation was cut. This "conser-
vative policy" also produced a reduction in taxation during the Afghanistan and second
Iraq campaign, leaving almost the whole burden of military outlay on borrowing from
the public. Nor do the data support the hypothesis that reductions in other government
spending represents military outlay financing course, although we note that there is a
significant reduction in civilian outlay in the Carter-Reagan military build-up5. We mo-
tivate our paper’s contribution stating that the effects of military spending on private
consumption also depend on the financing mechanisms of government outlay, recognizing
that unplanned episodes like wars are generally financed by budget deficits.
Thus, from the Keynesian perspective, wars typically determine a short-term economic
boom boosting aggregate demand and consumption, since greater military outlay is not
offset by the contraction caused by higher taxes. It is within this policy debate that
Feldstein (2008) suggested that any DoD budget cuts may be misguided. He also argued
that in the recent downturn cycle, the U.S. government should have recognized the need
to increase government spending to offset the decline in consumer demand in the economy,
and argued that a rise in military spending would be the best way to provide this stimulus.
The latter predictions are not in line with empirical results in defence economics.
Boulding (1973), Edelstein (1990) and Pieroni (2009) have shown that private consump-
tion fluctuates negatively in response to military expenditure changes - even if not always
statistically significant - a result similar to those obtained for private investments (Smith,
1980). These results may be in line with the neoclassical hypothesis of the diversion
of government resources. The data shown above seem to emphasize the complexity of
the effects in the transmission channel toward private consumption, at least, because the
financing of the defence sector - and its shocks - may be related to those of civilian spend-
ing. Thus, by analyzing government spending effects between these components, one aim
is to capture explicitly the different persistence of the spending shocks.
We extend these arguments by a new Keynesian DSGE framework to find an explana-
tion for the possible sources of the crowding-out effect in military consumption observed
in some empirical evidence. We incorporate into our model a share of households who
do not have access to the bond market and who consume their current disposable income
5This result is not in contrast with the findings of Beetsma et al. (2007) who identified "within" substitutions between
military and civilian spending since the positive trend of civilian spending is associated with a stable pattern of military
spending, excluding war episodes.
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at each date. We show the co-existence of sticky prices and a different rule of financing
mechanisms for military and civilian spending. The next section illustrates the estimated
impulse response analysis of the components of fiscal policy for the U.S.
3 Empirical Evidence
In this section we provide evidence of the above-mentioned discussion by estimating the
impulse response functions (IRFs). We compare the results of the fiscal policy shocks of
the expenditure of military and civilian components in private consumption to explain
how contrasting theoretical models may rationalize the heterogeneity of the effects upon
them.
3.1 Specification and Identification
The strategy adopted here to identify the VAR model is based on the assumptions dis-
cussed in Bilbiie et al. (2008) that are consistent with the solution of the log-linearized
theoretical model presented in next Section6. In addition, the use of quarterly data sup-
ports the exogenous changes of civilian and military spending, respectively. This is in
line with the new Keynesian perspective which sustains that a discretionary fiscal policy
plausibly does not respond within a quarter to a change in the economy7.
As a baseline specification of our model we adopt a SVAR, the reduced form of which
is defined by the following dynamic equation:
Yt = c+ A (L)Yt−1 + Ut (1)
where Yt indicates the vector of variables specified below, A(L) is an auto-regressive lag
polynomial, c a constant term, and Ut the vector of reduced-form innovations. We focus
our analysis on the US and use a dataset from 1960:Q1 to 2010:Q4. The reasons for
choosing the U.S. were based on the data availability making this economy the main case
study of the effects of fiscal policy.
A way of approaching the difference between the fiscal policy components is to note
that the prevalence of these government spending shocks is distributed differently across
periods of time after World War II. As argued in Bilbiie et al. (2008), in the first part
6A recent review of the identification strategy in the VAR literature is discussed in Beetsma and Giulidori (2011).
7Following Auerbach (2000, p. 16), "there are many reasons why fiscal decisions announced in advance may not be taken
at face value by the public. The yearly budget is often largely a political document, which is discounted as such by the
private sector; any decision to change taxes or spending in the future may be modified before the planned implementation
time arrives; and... changes in expenditure policy typically have involved not simply changes in program rules, but rather
changes in future spending targets, with the ultimate details left to be worked out later and the feasibility of eventually
meeting the targets uncertain."
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of the sample (e.g., until the end of 70’s) defence spending was prevalent, while last part
of the sample (e.g., until the first years of XXI century) was dominated by shocks to
civilian spending. We measure the contemporaneous correlation between the two shocks
to defence and civilian spending in GDP and we find that this measure of 0.32 is large
enough to undermine the results when we choose the order of the government spending
variables in a hypothetical VAR built on the components of government spending 8.
We thus estimate separately the impulse responses of defence and civilian expenditures
from a five-variable VAR. Following the strategy mentioned in equation (1), we specify
before the model analyzing the effects of the civilian component:
Yt = [Ct,Wt, DINCt, BDt, NMt] (2)
composed of private consumption Ct, real wages Wt, disposable income DINCt, the
government budget deficit BDt and the civilian spending NMt9. The empirical specifi-
cation includes, respectively: the log of real private final consumption expenditure per
capita (C); real wages (W ), corresponding to the log of real compensation of employees;
disposable income (DINC), corresponding to real personal disposable income (obtained
from the FRED-II database); civilian spending (NM) obtained from the Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis, National Economic Accounts as the difference between government con-
sumption expenditure and national defence data10; and a measure of budget deficit (BD)
corresponding to gross government fixed capital formation (IG) minus net government
saving (SAV G). Consistently with the model developed herein, both civilian spending
and the budget deficit enter the VAR as a ratio of lagged GDP. All the other real variables
are deflated by the GDP deflator. The variables expressed in per capita terms are divided
by working-age population.
As an identification strategy for fiscal policy shocks, we adopt a Cholesky factoriza-
tion, in order to recover the vector of structural shocks t (and its variance Ω) from the
reduced-form error Ut in (1). It is worthwhile noticing that the structural identification of
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) of government spending shocks is identical to a Choleski de-
composition, in which government spending is ordered before the other variables11. Here,
we assume the following set of conditions. We consider civilian spending as the most
8Note that this contemporaneous correlation is slightly different from the one of 0.18 estimated by Blanchard and Perotti
(2002). The motivation resides in the different years used in the dataset.
9The source for almost all the variables used is the OECD Economic Outlook No. 88.
10Since we are interested in short to medium-run effects of shocks to government purchases on private consumption,
we omit investments from the data. As a robustness check, we include service of capital, but results obtained in the
VAR-estimates were close to those presented below.
11As in Blanchard and Perotti (2002), the condition for identification is that the component of government spending does
not respond to government or private macro-economic variables, contemporaneously.
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exogenous variable and analyze the effects of its increase (temporary or permanent). The
interaction between civilian expenditure and taxation rate influences the budget deficit: if
the civilian spending increase is financed by tax rises the budget deficit may be negative.
Conversely, if a civilian expenditure rise is not followed by a corresponding increase in
taxation rate, the budget deficit is positive. We implicitly assume that there are het-
erogeneous behaviours of consumers that include in the choice set decisions in the asset.
Because household demands for goods depend on the expected value of taxes (i.e., dispos-
able income), each household subtracts its share of this present value (real wage) from the
expected present value of income, in order to determine a net wealth position. Lastly, we
consider private consumption as the most endogenous variable, which is therefore affected
by all contemporaneous values of all the variables in the VAR.
Since we are primarily concerned with comparison of the private consumption effects
of civilian and military shocks, we repeat the same experiment substituting civilian ex-
penditure (NMt) with military spending (Mt) in the VAR model. In this case, the vector
of variables Yt in equation (1) may be expressed as:
Yt = [Ct,Wt, DINCt, BDt,Mt] . (3)
Similarly to the civilian spending case, military spending enters the VAR as a ratio of
lagged GDP. Again, we adopt a Cholesky factorization in which private consumption, real
wages, disposable income and budget deficits are allowed to depend on the fiscal variable
(in this case, military expenditure) and are ordered, respectively.
3.2 Results
We estimate two VAR models according to specification equations (2) and (3) in order to
obtain the empirical IRFs. According to the Schwarz information criterion, the number
of lags is set to two. In both the specifications for the VAR estimates, we include two
dummies corresponding to the dates 1963:Q3 and 1984:Q4. The first allows us to capture
the expectation effect related to the threat of the armed conflict onset. The second should
account for the change of the monetary regime that had important implications for fiscal
policy during early 80’s (see, for example the work by Davig and Leeper, 2011).
Diagnostic tests indicate the absence of serial correlation in the residuals by a Lagrange
Multiplier test. We also fail to reject the hypothesis of normality of residuals with Jarque-
Bera statistics and check the stability condition of the VAR, finding that all eigenvalues
lie comfortably inside the unit circle. We also test for the presence of cointegrating
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relationships among the variables, finding mixed evidence according to rank and maximum
eigenvalue tests. As a result, we decide not to impose any cointegrating restriction, and
thus estimate both the VARs with the variables in levels (Sims et al., 1990; Giordano et
al., 2007).
Figure 1 shows the effects of civilian spending on endogenous variables of equation (2).
In accordance with this line of inquiry, in order to derive the 16th and 84th percentiles
of the impulse response distribution in the graphs, we perform Monte Carlo simulations
and assume normality in the parameter distribution. Accordingly, we construct t-tests
based on 10,000 different responses generated by simulations, and check whether the
point estimates of the mean impulse responses are statistically different from zero. The
responses of the five variables are expressed by multiplying the estimated parameters of
the VAR by the sample average share of civilian spending in GDP.
We note that civilian spending (graph a)) increases significantly and does not display
a large persistence. To give an idea in order to compare below with shocks in military
spending, the pattern of persistence decreases with a half-life of about two years. The
response of the budget deficit variable (graph b)) indicates a contrasting pattern: al-
though it starts positively, it decreases and remains significantly negative, meaning that
unexpected civilian expenditure appears to be financed by an increase in the taxation
rate.
Concerning disposable income (graph c)), we observe a positive pattern for all of the
period considered. This result is in line with the prediction of the new Keynesian models
with limited asset market participation, where the low persistence of civilian spending
shock reduces the present discounted value of taxes and the wealth effect on asset holders.
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Notes: Estimated impulse responses to a civilian spending shock in SVAR. Sample Period 1960:1-2010:4. Horizontal axis:
quarters after shock. Confidence intervals: (+/-)1 standard deviations of empirical distributions, based on 10,000 Monte
Carlo replications.
Figure 1: Response of VAR model to a civilian spending shock
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As predicted by the new Keynesian models, real wage (graphs d)) shows a positive
and persistent response to a unitary shock of civilian spending. Most interestingly, the
effect of a civilian expenditure shock on consumption is shown to be significant for a
large time-span, persistently above zero (graph e)). As we can observe, the response of
consumption follows, almost one-for-one, that of disposable income.
Figure 2 displays the IRFs of VAR in equation (3) to a positive shock in military
spending. Defence expenditure response (graph a)) rises significantly showing a higher
persistence with respect to civilian shocks. From the patterns of IFRs, we estimate that to
achieve half-life takes more than eight years. Graph b) pertains to the estimated response
of the budget deficit variable, reproducing the evidence in the U.S., shown in the Section
2, that the defence sector is largely financed by budget deficits.
The response of disposable income is negative (graph c)) due to the high persistence
of military spending shock that increases the present discounted value of taxes and the
wealth effect on Ricardian households.
The point estimates shown in the IRFs indicate that real wages decrease in response
to the military spending shock (graph d)). Interestingly, as found in the defence spending
literature which follows the neoclassical point of view, the pattern of consumption also
decreases its impact (graph e)), and the point estimates reveal that the shock may produce
a significant effect. Also in this case, the consumption follows, almost one-for-one the
pattern of disposable income response.
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Notes: Estimated impulse responses to a military spending shock in SVAR. Sample Period 1960:1-2010:4. Horizontal axis:
quarters after shock. Confidence intervals: (+/-)1 standard deviations of empirical distributions, based on 10,000 Monte
Carlo replications.
Figure 2: Response of VAR model to a military spending shock
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The robustness of the results presented for the components of government expendi-
ture is tested by the estimated fiscal policy multipliers on consumption. Table 2 lists
the results. Particularly interesting for our study is the fact that positive multipliers on
consumption of civilian expenditure, for the 4th, the 8th and the 12th quarter, are +0.25,
+1.73, and +3.88, respectively. On the contrary - as expected from the point estimates
- consumption multipliers are negative for military expenditure for the same quarters,
between −0.47, −1.27 and −2.32, respectively. Confidence intervals of these govern-
ment expenditures at 95% also indicate a statistical significance of separate consumption
multipliers, emphasizing the important differences in the transmission IRFs responses of
military and civilian expenditures shocks on private consumption.
Table 2: Estimated fiscal policy effects (civilian and military spending)
Estimated Fiscal Policy Multipliers
Quarters 4 8 12
Civilian spending 0.25 1.73 3.88
[0.16/0.34] [1.49/1.97] [3.43/4.34]
Military spending -0.47 -1.27 -2.32
[-0.39/-0.55] [-1.07/-1.46] [-1.98/-2.67]
Notes: Results from cumulated IRFs. 95% confidence intervals (CI) are listed in brackets.
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4 A Theoretical Model
The previous section showed dynamic consequences of fiscal policy shocks for civilian
and military components on the U.S. consumption. Our aim here is to assess whether
our model can account for these estimated patterns. We first present the log-linearized
equations under a simple dynamic general equilibrium model with new Keynesian predic-
tions. Then, we focus on the key fiscal transmission channels related to: (i) the financing
mechanism of the specific expenditure, and (ii) the persistence of military and civilian
shocks.
4.1 The Basic new Keynesian Framework
This subsection describes the model, which follows the framework of Galì et al. (2007).
The model consists of an economy populated by a continuum of infinitely lived households
in which these are divided into Ricardian and non-Ricardian behaviours. In particular,
consider λ the share of non-Ricardian households present in the economy, that is, house-
holds which do not have access to capital markets and consume their current labour
income. Conversely, complementary share 1− λ defines Ricardian households.
As regards labour market structure, it is assumed that there is an economy-wide union
setting wages in a centralized manner. Hence, hours worked are not chosen optimally by
households, but are determined by firms, given the wage set and the union.
The economy produces a single final good and a continuum of intermediate goods.
The final goods sector is perfectly competitive and is consumed by households. There is
monopolistic competition in the markets for intermediate goods, each of which is produced
by a single firm. The model assumes that intermediate an goods producer faces restrictions
in the price setting process, as in Calvo (1983). In particular, θ defines the probability of
a firm keeping its prices unchanged, and 1−θ that of an intermediate firm can re-optimize
its prices.
The model encompasses a monetary authority which sets its policy instrument, the
nominal interest rate, according to a generalised Taylor rule (1993).
The detailed linearized model is set out in Table 3, except the equations related to
the government sector. We are going to analyse them in detail in the next subsection
since our main contribution relates to consumption responses to shocks of fiscal policy
components.
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Table 3: Linearized model equations
Equations Log-linearized equation
Tobin’s q equation qt = βEt {qt+1}+[1− β (1− δ)]Et
{
rkt+1
}
− (rt − Et {pit+1})
Investment equation it − kt = ηqt
Capital accumulation kt+1 = δit + (1− δ) kt
Euler equation for Ricardians crt = Et {crt+1} − (rt − Et {pit+1})
Euler equation for non-Ricardians cnrt =
(
WNnr
Cnr
)
(wt + nnrt )−
(
Y
Cr
)
tnrt
Aggregate consumption equation ct = λcnrt + (1− λ) crt
Aggregate hours worked equation nt = λnnrt + (1− λ)nrt
Wage equation wt = ct + ϕnt
Intertemporal eq. condition for agg. cons. ct = Et {ct+1} − σ (rt − Et {pit+1})−
ΘnEt {∆nt+1}+ ΘtaxEt {∆tnrt+1}
New Keynesian Phillips curve pit = β {pit+1} − λpµˆpt
Price mark-up equation µpt = (yt − nt)− wt = (yt − kt)− rkt
Production function of final good firms yt = (1− α)nt + αkt
Monetary policy function rt = r + φpipit
Definitions
tnrt =
Tnrt −Tnr
Y
rt ≡ Rt − 1
Parameters
σ = γcΦµp (1− λ)
Θn = λΦ (1− α) (1 + ϕ)
Θtax = λΦµp
Φ = (γcµp − λ (1− α))−1
γc ≡ CY
λp = (1− βθ) (1− θ) 1θ
Notes: Lower-case letters denote log-deviations with respect to the corresponding steady state values. qt is the current value of
capital stock, rkt+1, the expected rental rate, rt, the nominal interest rate, pit+1, the expected inflation, it, the investment, kt,
the capital service, crt , the consumption of Ricardian households, c
nr
t , the consumption of non-Ricardian households, n
r
t , the
hours worked of Ricardian households, nnrt , the hours worked of non-Ricardian households, wt, the real wage rate, t
nr
t , the
lump sum taxes of non-Ricardian consumers, ct, the aggregate consumption, nt, the aggregate hours worked, µpt , the price
mark-up, yt, the final output.
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4.2 The Government Sector: Military and Civilian Expenditures
Government budget constraints assume that to finance public spending, the government
should issue bonds and raise lump-sum taxes. As one of the main aims of this paper, we
separate government purchases into the components of expenditure of civilian (NMt) and
military (Mt) and, consequently, display a composite budget constraint as:
PtTt +R−1t Bt+1 = Bt + Pt(NMt +Mt) (4)
where : Tt ≡ λT nrt + (1− λ)T rt
where Tt denotes the real taxes (lump sum) paid by (Ricardian and non-Ricardian) con-
sumers to the government, and the variable Bt+1 the quantity of one-period bonds pur-
chased by households at time t. Pt denotes the price level. The last expression encom-
passes the sum of civilian and military components according to the additive principle.
Equation (5) shows that linearization of the government budget constraint remains
around the steady state, with zero debt and a balanced primary budget:
bt+1 =
1
β
(bt + nmt +mt − tt) (5)
where : nmt ≡ NMt −NM
Y
where : mt ≡ Mt −M
Y
and : tt ≡ Tt − T
Y
and : bt ≡ (Bt/Pt−1)− (B/P )
Y
where nmt, mt and tt are expressed as deviations from their respective steady states
and normalized by steady state output, whereas budget deficit is given by the real deficit
at time t, divided by the last period’s prices minus the steady state nominal deficit and
normalized by steady state of output.
Fiscal policy rules have been studied extensively, for instance, by Bohn (1998) and
Galí and Perotti (2003). Here, we assume an extension that allows us to consider the two
different fiscal policy components:
tt = φbbt + φnmnmt + φmmt (6)
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where φnm and φm are parameters indicating the response of taxes to civilian and
military expenditures, respectively. φb is the parameter capturing the response of taxes
to budget deficit in the case of increases in civilian and military expenditures.
If we insert the fiscal policy rule (6) into the linearized budget constraint (5), we obtain:
bt+1 =
1
β
(1− φb) bt + 1
β
(1− φnm)nmt + 1
β
(1− φm)mt (7)
A necessary and sufficient condition for non-explosive deficit dynamics is given by:
1
β
(1− φb) bt < 1 ⇒ φb > 1− β (8)
This assumption is crucial in order to choose the value of φb in the model calibration.
Civilian and military expenditures (in deviations from their respective steady states,
and normalized by output steady state) evolve exogenously, according to two distinct
first-order autoregressive processes. Indeed, we assume that the resources destined for
civilian and military sectors are (AR(1)) processes in line with the dynamic responses of
our VAR based estimates:
nmt = ρnmnmt−1 + nmt (9)
where : 0 < ρnm < 1 nmt ∼ N (0, σ2 )
and:
mt = ρmmt−1 + mt (10)
where : 0 < ρm < 1 mt ∼ N (0, σ2 )
where ρnm and ρm are persistence parameters, and nmt , mt are the i.i.d. shocks of
civilian and military expenditures.
4.3 Market Clearing
The final goods market is in equilibrium if production equals demand by total household
consumption, aggregate private investment and total government spending. The log-
linearized market equilibrium condition may be expressed as follows:
yt = γcct + γiit + nmt +mt (11)
where : γc = CY
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γi = IY
where γc and γi denote the steady state ratios of consumption-output and investment-
output, respectively. Note that, even disentangling government spending in its compo-
nents of expenditure, the steady state of consumption does not depend on the fraction of
non-Ricardian consumers (as reported in Appendix).
5 Model Simulations
We now explore the quantitative implications of the model, first examining the parameters
used in the calibration model (Subsection 5.1). We then analyze the structural model
presented above by matching its implied impulse responses with those obtained from the
SVAR. We carry out simulation experiments of the effects of government expenditure
components within the framework of our structural model.
5.1 Calibration of the Parameters
We propose a model calibration with quarterly data starting from "standard" parameters
extracted from new Keynesian literature. While here we discuss briefly the model param-
eters, Table 4 summarizes their values and sources. Thus, the discount factor, β, is set at
0.99, which implies an annual steady state real interest rate of 0.04. while depreciation
rate, δ, is set at 0.025 per quarter, which implies an annual depreciation on capital of
0.10. In addition, α, at 0.30, which roughly implies a steady state share of U.S. labour
income in total output of 0.70. In addition, we fix the parameter capturing the mark-up,
µp, at 0.2. The fraction of non-Ricardian households, λ, is set at 0.5, a value which is in
line with the one assumed by Galí et al. (2007), within the range of estimated values in
the literature (see Mankiw, 2000).
The probability of firms keeping their prices unchanged, θ, is fixed at 0.75 (see Bilbiie
et al., 2008). The value for the elasticity of wages with respect to hours worked, ϕ, is set
at 0.2, in line with the calibrations of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997, 1999). Following
King and Watson (1996), the elasticity of investment with respect to q, η, is fixed at 1.
Lastly, we follow Clarida et al. (2000) in setting the parameter, capturing the response
of the monetary authority to inflation, φpi, at 1.5. This value clearly satisfies the Taylor
principle.
Now we focus on the parameters describing the fiscal sector which are estimated from
our sample. In equation (6), we set the parameters capturing the responses of civilian
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(φnm) and military (φm) expenditures to taxes, respectively. These values are obtained as
the difference of the estimated effects of the VAR in civilian/military expenditures and
the budget deficit. In line with the findings in the literature, the estimates for our sample
are of φnm=0.16 and φm=0.18.
We also estimate the persistence parameters of civilian and military expenditures, ρnm
and ρm, according to the procedure proposed by Marques (2004), in which the absence of
mean reversion of a given series is measured by using the following statistic:
ρ = 1− n
t
(12)
where n stands for the number of times the series crosses the mean during a time interval
with t observations. Montecarlo simulations have shown the correctness and consistence
of this estimator to obtain measure of persistence.
Our VAR-based estimates indicate the lower persistence of civilian spending shock,
whereas the higher persistence appears in the estimated patterns of military expenditure.
By using the persistent estimator in equation (12), after detrending the time-series of the
fiscal components, we estimate n = 60 for civilian and n = 8 for military spending, such
as we have ρnm = 0.7 and ρm = 0.97, respectively12.
Finally, given ρnm, ρm, φnm and φm, we calibrate the parameter φb such that the
dynamics of civilian spending (9), military expenditure (10) and debt (7) are consistent
with the horizon at which the deficit is back to steady state, matching our empirical VAR
responses of the fiscal deficit. Thus, we fix φb equal to 0.1.
12The persistences can also be obtained by the AR(1) coefficients that match the half-life of the estimated government
expenditure responses. We estimated them for civilian and military expenditures and the results were similar to the ones
based on the hypothesis of the absence of mean reversion.
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Table 4: Calibrated Parameters of the Model
Parameter Symbol Value Target/Source
Discount Factor β 0.99 Steady state real interest rate: 0.04
Elasticity of Investment wrt q η 1 King and Watson (1996)
Depreciation Rate δ 0.025 Annual depreciation on capital: 0.10
Fraction of non-Ricardians λ 0.5 Galì et al. (2007)
Capital Share α 1/3 Labour share: 70%
Elasticity of Wages wrt Hours Worked ϕ 0.2 Rotemberg and Woodford (1997, 1999)
Mark-up Parameter µp 0.2 Galì et al. (2007)
Probability of Price Fixed θ 0.75 Average price duration: 4 quarters
Policy Rate Response to Inflation φpi 1.5 Clarida et al. (2000)
Response of Taxes to Civilian Spending φnm 0.16 Estimates from our data sample
Response of Taxes to Military Spending φm 0.18 Estimates from our data sample
Response of Taxes to Budget Deficit φb 0.1 Calibrated according our estimates
Persistence of Civilian Spending ρnm 0.7 Estimates from our sample
Persistence of Military Spending ρm 0.97 Estimates from our sample
Notes: Calibration of the parameters according quarterly data.
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5.2 Quantitative Implications for the Model with Heterogeneous Fiscal Pol-
icy Shocks
We begin by considering the baseline model in which the fraction of non-Ricardian house-
holds is large enough (λ = 0.5) and the probability of firms keeping their prices unchanged
(θ) is equal to 0.75. Figure 3 and 4 show the IRFs of the variables to positive civilian or
military spending shocks. The sizes of these shocks are normalized to 1% of the steady
states of the respective government expenditures.
We start by analyzing the implications of the model for two fiscal variables, i.e. the
specific government spending and the budget deficit. Graphs a) in Figures 3 and 4 display
that the model is able to mimic different persistence in military and civilian expenditures.
In particular, the IRFs show very similar patterns of civilian spending compared to total
government expenditure found in the literature (Galí et al., 2007), whereas the model
accounts for the higher level of persistence of VAR-estimates with respect to military
spending shock. The model does a better job of explaining the response of the budget
deficit to fiscal shocks. The decomposition of government purchases mimics their con-
trasting responses, enough so as to be close to our point estimates. As a first conclusion,
if we do not set different behaviours in financing government expenditure, the explica-
tive power of the model may deteriorate markedly, offsetting the heterogeneity of the
responses related to the source of financing the government spending. With respect to
civilian shock, a persistent and positive response to military spending shocks, emerges.
These results are in accordance with the idea that policy-makers in periods of uncertainty,
like wars or threat episodes, perceive the conflict challenges and their unpredictability by
developing preferences to postpone the taxation to the future generations.
23
Notes: The shock is normalized to 1% of civilian expenditure in steady state.
Figure 3: Dynamic effects of civilian spending shock
.
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Notes: The shock is normalized to 1% of military expenditure in steady state.
Figure 4: Dynamic effects of military spending shock
.
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The model closely reproduces the response of consumption, which now rises in a pro-
nounced way in civilian spending, but it is slightly negative to military spending shocks.
We state that the key reasons for explaining this result are based on how differences in
persistence of fiscal policy shocks act on the expectation of net wealth effect of Ricardian
consumers, in addition to the transmission channel of the budget deficit. Although we
know that the basic intuition for explaining consumption response is based on the inter-
play between labour demand and supply, here the complexity of the fiscal transmission
channels for specific government spending shocks is enhanced, because they are linked
heterogeneously with Ricardian and non-asset holder consumers. Based on the business
cycle models of "crowding-out" effects in consumption (Baxter and King, 1993), the higher
persistence of fiscal variables can increase the present discounted value of taxes and the
wealth effect on Ricardian consumers. Thus, since the response of consumption to the
components of government spending shocks depends on the positive or negative reaction
of the real wage, an high response of the real wage implies a large movement of private
consumption in response to these shocks. According to the results shown in graphs c)
and d) of Figure 3, this implies that an increase in civilian spending produces a lower
negative wealth effect on Ricardian consumers with respect to the opposite case. As a
consequence, a positive change in civilian spending implies a shift in the labour supply,
previously dominated by labour demand. A "crowding-in" effect therefore occurs, and
private consumption increases. Conversely, as we can note from graphs (c) and (d) of
Figure 4, the prediction of the "crowding-out" effect generated by a positive military ex-
penditure shock is based on the negative wealth effect by labour demand which prevails
over (non-negative) labour supply.
Here allowing for heterogeneous fiscal shocks alleviates the salient quantitative short-
comings of the aggregate government spending model and enables us to match the timing
of the consumption response much better. Note that, when we account for the transmis-
sion heterogeneous channel of deficit financing of military spending shocks, we can model
a different reduction of the income effect on non-Ricardian consumers. The approach to
specific components of government expenditure may indeed be justified not only by as-
suming an exogenous fraction of credit constrained agents, but also for the existence of a
precise portion of government spending which stimulates a fraction of consumers, specifi-
cally those who directly and indirectly benefit by that expenditure and who consume out
of it as a result (Giavazzi and McMahon, 2012).
Until now, we have shown the amplifying effects of the introduction of non-Ricardian
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consumers and sticky prices: the consumption response is expected systematically higher
than that generated by the neoclassical model - when prices are fully flexible, and/or when
all consumers are Ricardian, irrespective of the sector of expenditure. As an exercise,
Figure 5 compares the dynamic responses of private consumption to positive civilian
(graph a)) and military (graph b)) spending shocks under our baseline calibration and
with different parameterizations of λ and θ. In both the civilian and military cases, while
the first three IRFs mimic different fractions of non-Ricardian households, λ, at 0.50 (our
benchmark), 0.25 and 0, with the probability of firms which keep their prices unchanged,
θ, equal to 0.75, the fourths IRF correspond to the neoclassic model calibration, which
excludes non-Ricardian consumers and considers fully flexible prices (e.g., λ = 0;θ = 0).
Graph a) of Figure 5 indicates that although the short-run effect is emphasized when
the model is simulated with the higher share of non-Ricardian consumers, even for a
share of non-Ricardian consumers λ equals to 0.25, the model generates a positive impact
on consumption after a positive fiscal policy shock. Only the closeness of neoclassical
consumers’ parameterization reduces the impact of a civilian positive shock on private
consumption to be non-significant. This result is emphasized in simulated neoclassical
model, where the positive civilian shock appears to affect negatively consumption, an
estimate in sharp contrast with the empirical evidence shown in Section 3.
Similarly, moving from our new Keynesian benchmark toward models with neoclassic
characteristics, we find that the negative response of consumption to a positive military
spending shock is strengthened and significant (graph b)). The magnitude of negative
impact is in accordance with the findings in the defence economics literature using partial
equilibrium specification13 and, from our perspective, is explained by the exclusion of
non-Ricardian consumers from the population of the investigated economy.
13See, for example, Pieroni (2009).
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Notes: solid black line: new Keynesian case; dotted red line: neoclassical case; dotted blue and green
lines: intermediate cases.
Figure 5: Sensitivity analysis: baseline vs. neoclassical model
.
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6 Conclusions
This paper analysed the heterogeneous effects of fiscal policy shocks on consumption.
The particular feature of our analysis is that we explicitly allowed for the impact of
both military and civilian spending. We used time-series U.S. data to reproduce IRFs
of these government spending components, emphasizing the differences with the current
literature addressed to evaluate the effects of aggregate government spending shocks. Most
interestingly, when we examined IRF estimates of components of fiscal policy, we found
that civilian spending mimics patterns in the variables close to aggregate ones, while a
negative impact was found between military spending shock and consumption response.
This contrasting result is mainly presumed to depend on the interplay of labour supply and
household demand and on contrasting budget deficit responses. We therefore examined
whether a new Keynesian model may account for these findings.
Our main results are as follows. Focusing on changes in military spending, we were
able to calibrate the negative consumption response of the VAR-estimates, identifying two
specific channels. Firstly, a positive response of the budget deficit, through which military
spending is generally financed, to military shocks in presence of non-asset households,
generates a less positive consumption response. However, when we calibrated the model
with the higher estimated parameters of persistence in military with respect to civilian
spending, its quantitative performance was enhanced and does not allow the findings
against the data to be rejected. That is, the crowding-out effect in Ricardian households,
generated by the persistence response of own shock on net wealth of this government
shock, can offset the "Keynesian" result produced by the deficit financing channel. As a
corollary, in a new Keynesian model, the lower persistence of civilian expenditure from
its own shocks can therefore predict a positive and significant response in consumption.
Although we believe that this analysis is a useful contribution to more effective man-
agement of fiscal policy tools on the expenditure side, it does leave several interesting
questions open for future research. Firstly, the general validity of our findings is certainly
limited by the closed-economy one-country investigation. We believe that comparative
analysis would give a more complete answer to our original question. Secondly, issues
in estimating the parameter of non-Ricardian households has received increasing interest
in the macro-econometric literature. Obviously, a framework which includes Bayesian
estimation provides opportunities for future research.
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Appendix: Steady State Analysis of the Components of Fiscal
Policy
Here we show that the steady state ratio of consumption to total output does not depend
on the fraction of non-Ricardian consumers. Note that the market clearing condition for
final goods implies:
Yt = Ct + It +NMt +Mt ⇒ Ct = Yt − It −NMt −Mt (A1)
and in steady state:
C = Y − I −NM −M (A2)
Dividing by Y and knowing that I
K
= δ, we can write:
γc = 1− δα
α Y
K
− γnm − γm (A3)
where γc = CY , γnm =
NM
Y
and γm = MY .
When we consider the marginal product of capital:
α
Y
K
λt (j) = Rk (A4)
the first order condition of the intermediate firm’s problem in steady state:
MC = 1
µp
= λt (j) (A5)
we obtain:
Rk = αY
µpK
(A6)
Let:
Rk = 1
β
− 1 + δ (A7)
we can equate:
Rk = 1
β
− 1 + δ = αY
µpK
= Rkt (A8)
solving for:
30
1
β
− 1 + δ = αY
µpK
⇒ αY
K
= µp
(
1
β
− 1 + δ
)
(A9)
Lastly, we obtain:
γc = 1− δα
α Y
K
− γnm − γm
= (1− γnm − γm)− δα
α Y
K
= (1− γnm − γm)− δα
µp
(
1
β
− 1 + δ
)
This result confirms that the steady state ratio between consumption and output is
independent from share of non-Ricardian consumers.
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